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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the effect of PROGRESA education grants on school enrollment. It looks at 
its effect on total school enrollment and in particular on school enrollment of drop-outs, i.e. 
those children who face a re-enrollment decision since they were not enrolled in school the year 
prior to the implementation of the PROGRESA program. Estimates of the impact of 
PROGRESA education grants on drop-outs and non-drop-outs are obtained applying difference 
estimation and maximum likelihood estimation of a reduced form equation for schooling 
decision. Differences in results between both groups of children are discussed looking at the 
distribution of marginal effects. PROGRESA did send drop-outs back to school. It had a larger 
effect on drop-outs than on non-drop-outs. However, for the particular group of girls who 
dropped out of school just before attending secondary school PROGRESA grants only had a 
minor effect. This last finding highlights the fact that determinants of the schooling decision are 
different for young girls and that PROGRESA grants do not provide a strong enough incentive 
to send them back to school. 
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1 Introduction
Since the middle of the 1990’s there has been a widespread use of anti-poverty pro-
grams in developing countries that condition aid on the behavior of the beneficiary.
These programs run by central governments aim at helping the poorest families to
reach higher levels of welfare. At the same time they try to promote development
and growth of the economy.
Some of the most popular anti-poverty programs in developing countries focus on
education. There is general about the key role of education as an anti-poverty and
pro-growth policy via the effect of education on the accumulation of human capital.
In addition, although education in some countries is compulsory until the secondary
school level, it has been suggested that additional economic incentives are needed to
reduce the observed high levels of drop-outs.
The increasing use of anti-poverty programs has been accompanied by comprehen-
sive evaluations about the actual effectiveness of these programs. This has occurred
not only because of the intrinsic interest in these programs but also because anti-
poverty programs represent an important financial effort, both by governments and
international institutions which often provide additional funds.
The program evaluation literature has been widely developed in the last decades
with the seminal work of a group of economists on papers dealing with the evaluation
of policies in the USA. These include, among others, Heckman (1992), Heckman
(1997), Imbens and Angrist (1994), Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), Manski
(1996), Heckman, Ichimura, and Taber (1997) and Angrist (1998).
Policy makers are undoubtedly interested in the overall effect of the program on
the target population; thus, many papers in the theoretical literature have focused
on the estimation of an “average treatment effect” or ATE. More specifically, the
ATE can be computed as the average difference between an outcome variable for all
individuals in a treated group and those in an untreated or control group. It is worth
noting that the ATE can be interpreted as the actual causal effect of the program
provided that the control group is reasonably well selected; i.e., individuals in both
groups must be (ex-ante) comparable.
Although the ATE can be a good general characterization of the overall (average)
effect, it is obvious that any program will have a different impact on different indi-
viduals. Some of them will benefit a lot whereas others will not. Therefore, it is also
important to take into account individual heterogeneity.
This paper focuses on a Mexican anti-poverty program for rural communities,
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called PROGRESA. The program comprise three major areas one of which, the sub-
ject of this paper, is education. In particular, program beneficiaries are given financial
aid conditional on school attendance. This paper analyzes the effects of such grants
on school enrollment for two different groups of beneficiaries, drop-outs and non-
drop-outs. The identification of these effects relies on the randomized assignment of
the program benefits.
Following the arguments presented above, in what constitutes its main contri-
bution, this paper tracks the differential effect of the program on individuals that
dropped out of school before the program started. These children are facing a re-
enrollment decision that may imply higher direct and/or indirect costs of schooling
than the costs faced by the average child. Moreover, drop-outs are different from
the average child in some observable characteristics related to the schooling decision.
Thus, we can expect a different effect of the program on them. The methodologies
applied are difference estimation and maximum likelihood estimation of a reduced
form equation of education choice. For both cases the randomized design of PRO-
GRESA is exploited. The outcome is the causal effect of the education component of
this program. It allow us to evaluate how successful PROGRESA was in increasing
enrollment rates among ex-ante drop-outs.
The structure of the paper is as follow. Section 2 presents the main features of
the program and a brief review of the literature evaluating PROGRESA. Section 3
discuses factors that influence the enrollment decision and presents differences to the
re-enrollment decision made by drop-outs. Section 4 describes characteristics of the
PROGRESA data base. It provides some main statistics that focus on the differ-
ences between drop-outs and non-drop-outs. In Section 5 results for the difference
estimation of the effects of the program are presented for both groups and are an-
alyzed separately. Section 6 introduces a reduced form equation for the schooling
decision including PROGRESA education grants variables. Section 7 presents maxi-
mum likelihood estimates of a probit model for schooling decision, comparing results
for non-drop-outs and drop-outs. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper with its main
results and some suggestions for future research.
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2 The PROGRESA program and its education com-
ponent
The Education, Health and Nutrition program, PROGRESA, was implemented by
the Federal Government of Mexico in 1997, with the aim of helping the poorest
families in rural communities. A fundamental characteristic of the program is that
aid is conditioned on a specific behavior of the beneficiary. This conditionality tries to
guarantee that the program does not lead to undesired outcomes, such as distortions
in work decisions, and that it successfully accomplishes its initial objectives.
The program comprises actions in three major areas: education, health and nu-
trition. The education component includes monthly grants for children of a family
qualified as beneficiary. They need to be less than 18 years old, enrolled in school be-
tween the 3rd year of primary school and the 3rd year of junior secondary school, and
to fulfill a minimum attendance requirement. The grants are not based on academic
achievement. A child who does not pass a grade is still eligible for the grant in the
following year. But if the child fails the same grade twice, she/he losses eligibility.
The grant increases by years of schooling. In the junior secondary level the grant is
slightly higher for girls, since there exist evidence that in poor families girls are more
likely to drop-out of school and that they also tend to drop-out earlier than boys.
Additionally, beneficiaries receive an annual grant for school supplies. The health
component of the PROGRESA program consists of a basic package of free health
services, nutritional supplements, and informative talks on health, nutrition, fertility,
and hygiene. Special attention is paid to pregnant women and children younger than
five years. Finally, the nutrition component of the program supplies beneficiary fam-
ilies with a monthly monetary payment intended to improve amount and diversity of
food consumption and thus increase the nutritional status, in particular of children.
This aid is independent of residence, and size, and composition of the family. All aid
is given to the mother of the family as there exist evidence that mothers are better
than fathers at allocating family resources.
A family is qualified as being poor and thus eligible for the program according to
a single index. This index contains information on family income and housing like
presence of running water, etc.1
Some numbers can provide a better understanding of the extent and significance
1For a complete analysis of the targeting see Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999a) and Skoufias,
Davis, and Behrman (1999b).
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of PROGRESA as an anti-poverty policy. In 1997 the program reached 6,357 com-
munities, giving aid to 300,705 families. This implied transfers of 34 million USD
(approx. 340 million Mexican pesos). After two years of being implemented the pro-
gram included nearly 2.6 million families in 72,345 communities in all 31 Mexican
states. It reached around 40% of all rural families and nearly 12% of all families
in Mexico. Total annual transfers of the program in 1999 were around 710 million
USD, equivalent to 0.15% of Mexican GDP. 40% were educational transfers, 42%
food transfers and 18% was spent on health transfers. Among the total annual cash
transfers of 578 million USD, food transfer accounted for 49%. The remaining 51%
went to education. In 1999 the program distributed 273 million USD in education
grants2.
Given the financial importance of PROGRESA, Mexican authorities have in-
tended to evaluate the program since its beginning, not only to measure results and
impacts but also to provide information that allow for a redesign of policies. Ac-
cordingly, in 1997 and 1998 a high quality data set was collected in 506 communities
where the program was to be implemented, and several surveys were carried out af-
terwards. In October 1998, the program was implemented in 320 randomly selected
communities (treated communities) while in the remaining 186 communities (control
communities) the implementation was postponed until December 19993. In Figure 1
below, I present the timing of the program.
2For more details on PROGRESA costs see Coady (2000).
3The quality of the randomization has been extensively documented in Behrman and Todd (1999),
who conclude that, at least at community level, the implementation of the random assignment was
performed successfully.
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Figure 1: Timing of the PROGRESA program
The evaluation of the program was conducted by the Mexican Federal Govern-
ment and by external local and international evaluators such as the National Institute
of Public Health (INSP, Mexico), Research and Advanced Studies Center in Social
Anthropology (CIESAS, Mexico), International Food Policy Research Institute (IF-
PRI), and Research and Educational Documentation Center (CIDE, Spain)4. The
evaluation efforts have resulted in an extensive literature by authors like Orazio At-
tanasio, Jere R. Behrman, David Coady, Costas Meghir, T. Paul Schultz, Emmanuel
Skoufias, Petra Todd and Kenneth Wolpin, among others.
This paper is closely related to Schultz (2004). In his paper Schultz presents
an extensive evaluation of the education component of PROGRESA. The author
performs pre-program comparisons to check the randomization of the design, and he
calculates difference and difference-in-difference estimators by gender and grade which
allow him to quantify the program’s causal effect. To validate difference estimations
he shows results of maximum likelihood estimation of a reduced form equation of the
school enrollment decision. He concludes that the program has effectively reached its
goal since he finds positive and large post-program differences in enrollment rates of
comparably poor children in treatment and control communities.
Other related relevant papers are Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005) and
Todd and Wolpin (2003), who follow a structural approach to evaluate PROGRESA.
4Corresponding web pages: Federal Government: www.oportunidades.gob.mx; INSP,
www.insp.mx; CIESAS, www.ciesas.edu.mx; IFPRI, www.ifpri.org; CIDE, www.mec.es/cide/
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They can thus simulate the effects of counterfactual programs and they can identify
alternative subsidy schemes with a greater impact on schooling decisions.
Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005) estimate the structural parameters of a
standard model of education choices that considers schooling as an individual deci-
sion. Similarly to Schultz (2004), they find that PROGRESA has a positive effect on
the school enrollment of children, especially after the completion of primary school.
They also show that a revenue neutral change in the program that increased the
grants for junior secondary school children while eliminating the ones for primary
school children, would have a substantially larger effect on enrollment of secondary
school children, while having only minor effects on the enrollment of primary school
children.
Todd and Wolpin (2003) estimate a dynamic behavioral model of parental deci-
sions about fertility and children schooling. Their paper differs from Attanasio, et al
in two main aspects. Todd and Wolpin (2003) model schooling as a family decision.
They use data from the control group prior to the experiment in the validation and
estimation of the model, i.e. they use only pre-program information in the estimation
of the parameters of interest. They then apply the model to analyze the effectiveness
of alternative policies to increase enrollment rates.
3 Enrollment vs. re-enrollment decision
3.1 Influential factors for the enrollment decision
From an economic point of view, the school enrollment decision is taken based on the
private price of schooling. The total price of schooling includes tuition fees, direct
costs of attending school, such as clothing, books, materials and transportation costs
but also the opportunity cost if attending school. Since in Mexican rural communities
public schools are mostly tuition-free, the main component of the price of schooling
is the opportunity cost of time. A student could devote her/his time spent at school
to other activities, such as paid work, farming, or any other productive activity at
home. PROGRESA directly reduces the price of schooling through grants and aid
for school supplies. From this reduction in the price of schooling, we would expect a
positive effect of the program on enrollment rates.
The main component of the opportunity cost of schooling is the rural wage a child
can earn as farming or home production activities are difficult to measure in monetary
terms. Unfortunately only a small fraction of communities report such information.
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As a proxy we consider the agricultural wage for adult male.
In communities with high salaries we expect that children are less likely to go
to school, because they face a higher opportunity cost. Additionally, medium and
large cities have more developed labor markets that usually offer higher wages. So
we expect a child residing near a metropolitan area or near the main city of her/his
municipality to be more likely to drop-out of school and to work instead.
Transportation cost are an important direct cost of schooling for children attend-
ing junior secondary school. Only in 25% of all communities under study have a
proper junior secondary school. A reasonable proxy for this cost is the distance from
the community where the child resides to the nearest one that has a secondary school.
In all the communities studied there exist at least one primary school, so we can set
transportation costs for primary school children equal to zero.
Given that a child’s schooling is a family decision, it is necessary to analyze family
characteristics that may influence this decision. There is a general agreement that
more educated parents are more likely to send their children to school. If the father
lives at home and works we expect his children to be more likely to go to school, as
the financial situation of the family is more stable. Health and work status of the
head of the household are also relevant for a child’s schooling decision. If the head of
the household was unemployed or ill for some weeks before the children should have
been enrolled at school it is likely that the children are sent to work.
3.2 The re-enrollment decision
The focus of this paper is not the overall population but those children that are
making a re-enrollment choice, i.e. drop-outs. Drop-outs are those who have made
the decision of not attending school at some point in time and were not enrolled in
October 1997, before the implementation of PROGRESA. These children were not
receiving enough incentives to go to school, to improve their educational level, and
to contribute finally to human capital accumulation and the development of their
communities. Regarding the aim of PROGRESA, drop-outs are thus an important
target of the program.
Is there any reason to think that PROGRESA education grants could have a
different impact on enrollment rates of drop-outs than on those of non-drop-outs?
A hypothetical answer to this question can be made based on observable differences
between both groups. In particular, we can look at information provided by the pre-
program census (October 1997) and interpret it referring to the conclusions from the
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previous subsection. Some numbers are given in Table 1 below.
As I expect values of some variables to be different for different levels of schooling
and gender, data is presented separately for primary and secondary school children
and for girls and boys. The primary school sample includes all children aged 6 to 18
who have completed 0-5 years of schooling and are thus qualified to enroll in primary
school grades 1 to 6. In the secondary school sample I considered all children aged
11 to 18 who have completed at least 6 years of schooling and are thus qualified to
enroll in junior or senior secondary school.
Table 1: Difference in averages and proportions of selected variables between Drop-
outs and Non-drop-outs (pre-program census)
Variable name Primary Secondary
Female Male Female Male
Percentage of children belonging
to a poor family 4.2*** 3.7*** 8.0*** 3.7*
Mother’s schooling (years) -1.5*** -1.3*** -1.0*** -1.0***
Percentage of children with
father living at home -3.4** -5.8*** 0.9 -0.1
Number of siblings enrolled
at school -1.7*** -1.6*** -1.2*** -1.3***
Distance to secondary school (km) 0.92*** 0.64*** 1.11*** 0.74***
Distance to metropolitan area (km) -17.6*** -19.3*** -22.8*** -31.4***
* Statistical significance = 10%. ** Statistical significance = 5%. *** Statistical significance = 1%.
The statistical significance of the differences is tested using tests for equality of means and proportions.
Having a more educated mother increases the probability of enrollment for non-
drop-outs. The positive effect of parents’ education on the education of their children
is well known. Additionally, the proportion of children of families with the father
living at home is higher, making them more likely to attend school (at least in primary
school). Non-drop-outs face lower direct cost of schooling since they live closer to a
secondary school.
On the other hand, drop-outs reside closer to metropolitan areas and the main
cities of their municipalities. Drop-outs reside in communities with higher wages.
These facts imply a higher opportunity cost of schooling leading to a lower probability
of re-enrollment for drop-outs. Moreover, a higher proportion of them belong to a
poor family, making them more likely to work and not to attend school.
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Additional information is given in the surveys that were carried out after PRO-
GRESA started. In particular, these surveys ask why the child was not enrolled
in school. For drop-outs the answers are: “There was not enough money” (47%),
“She/he did not like going to school” (26%), “The school was very far away” (9%),
and “Her/his help was needed at work or at home” (4%). Clearly the main reason
for not attending school are financial restrictions at home making the alternative of
working even more attractive.
Summing up, there exists enough evidence to conclude that drop-outs have more
incentives to work rather than to attend school compered to non-drop-outs. Given
the higher opportunity cost of schooling that drop-outs face and since the grants are a
monetary incentive5, I expect the effect of the program on drop-outs to be larger than
on the average child. Thus, the proposed hypothesis based on observable character-
istics is that the program has a stronger effect on the schooling decision of drop-outs.
However, we do not know in which direction any unobservable characteristic of the
child, like ability or ambition, could affect the schooling decision and if it could affect
the schooling decision of drop-outs and non-drop-outs in a different way.
4 Data base and descriptive statistics
Since in this paper I analyze the grants’ impact conditional on the schooling decision
children have made before the implementation of the program, only post-program
information can be used. From the education component of the PROGRESA post-
program surveys (October 1998, May 1999 and November 1999) a matched panel
sample for children aged 6 to 18 can be obtained. This panel includes 74,427 obser-
vations, 45,666 (61%) in the treatment group (individuals residing in a community
where PROGRESA grants were implemented in September 1998) and 28,761 (39%)
in the control group.
Before going into detail on the description of the data base, three comments should
be made. First, there exists a maximum amount of aid a household can receive by
means of the education component of the program. Those maximum amounts are
updated every six month (as it happens with grants). When the maximum is reached
each child receives only a percentage of the grant. Unfortunately, the exact amount
each child receives is not reported in the data base. For this reason what can be
5The monthly agricultural wage is around $ 500, but a child actually earns less than this amount.
A secondary school child’s grant is approximately $ 250. These numbers show how important
PROGRESA grants are as an additional source of family income.
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measured is only the effect on school enrollment of the “potential grant”. Using
this measure for the effect of the program we may overestimate the “actual grant”
effect. If the child’s family is not receiving the maximum amount the potential grant
coincides with the actual grant. In the PROGRESA data base the average number of
children in a family is 4. This makes it very likely for a family to attain the maximum
amount of aid.
The second comment is about the treatment group. Around 5% of those children
fulfilling the requirements to obtain the grant are not receiving it6. The reason for
this is not available in the data base. The grant amount for them is set to zero.
Finally, the variable reflecting the stock of education (years of schooling com-
pleted) presents some inconsistencies along the waves of the surveys. 29% of the
observations show some of these inconsistences. For this reason I perform a hand-
correction of the variable “stock of education”, making it consistent among waves
and with age and enrollment information.
In terms of the data base, drop-outs are those individuals aged 8 to 18 in the
post-program surveys who were not enrolled at school in the first census (October
1997). The re-enrollment or drop-outs panel includes 6,948 observations, 4,155 (60%)
in the treatment communities and 2,793 (40%) in the control communities.
Table 2 presents a set of descriptive statistics that characterize the population in
the drop-out panel.
6The exact numbers are 5.62% for non-drop-outs and 5.14% for drop-outs.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for Drop-outs (post-program surveys)
Variable Primary Secondary
Female Male Female Male
Sample size 1,310 1,490 2,431 1,717
Enrollment rate 0.526 0.528 0.258 0.259
Percentage of treatment communities 57.5 59.9 59.2 62.3
Percentage of children belonging
to a poor family 92.9 92.9 84.2 83.1
Percentage of children eligible
for receiving a grant 26.9 31.8 44.5 46.7
Grant (for grant different from zero) (pesos) 118.7 122.7 250.7 237.6
(31.4) (30.5) (22.9) (19.2)
Mother’s schooling (years) 1.5 1.6 2.1 2.0
(2.1) (2.0) (1.9) (2.1)
Percentage of children with
head of household ill 6.3 6.5 6.8 6.9
Percentage of children with
head of household employed 89.2 89.5 90.2 87.5
Percentage of children
with father not living at home 13.3 16.2 9.6 10.9
Number of girls from 5 to 16 2.0 1.0 1.9 1.0
(1.2) (1.0) (1.2) (1.0)
Number of boys from 5 to 16 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.9
(1.0) (1.3) (1.0) (1.2)
Number of children under 5 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.5
(1.0) (1.0) (0.9) (0.9)
Number of adult women 1.7 1.6 2.0 1.8
(0.9) (0.8) (1.0) (1.0)
Number of adult men 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.2
(1.0) (1.0) (1.4) (1.1)
Number of siblings enrolled at school 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.0
(1.5) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5)
Distance to secondary school (km) 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.6
(3.3) (3.0) (2.0) (1.9)
Percentage of children that have
a secondary school in their community 18.0 21.9 15.1 18.5
Distance to nearest metropolitan area (km) 131.8 131.0 129.2 125.2
(64.8) (59.7) (73.2) (66.4)
Distance to the main city
of her/his municipality (km) 11.2 11.2 12.0 10.7
(7.2) (7.2) (9.4) (7.4)
Community daily agricultural wage (pesos) 29.4 30.2 33.4 31.8
(11.4) (11.2) (11.9) (11.6)
Standard deviations are in parenthesis (continued in Appendix as Table 1-continued)
Table 6 of the Appendix reports similar statistics for non-drop-outs.
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In both tables variables are somewhat different for girls and boys, as expected.
Also, we see different variable values for children in primary and in secondary school.
Hence, I want to use an estimation strategy that will allow for differences in the
program’s effects by gender and by level of education.
Comparing Table 2 and Table 6 we observe differences between drop-outs and
non-drop-outs. Below, in Table 3 there is a list of variables for which means and
proportions in both panels are statistically different.
Table 3: Difference in variable means and proportions between Drop-outs and Non-
drop-outs (post-program surveys)
Variable name Primary Secondary
Female Male Female Male
Enrollment rates -0.450*** -0.443*** -0.508*** -0.531***
Percentage of children belonging
to a poor family 3.5*** 3.1*** 3.7*** 1.2
Mother’s schooling (years) -1.6*** -1.4*** -0.8*** -0.9***
Percentage of children with
head of household employed -2.6*** -2.1*** 0.1 -1.9**
Percentage of children
with father living at home -3.5*** -6.1*** 0.7 -0.2
Number of siblings enrolled at school -0.7*** -0.6*** -0.6*** -0.6***
Community daily agricultural wage (pesos) -1.2*** -0.4 1.7*** 0.7**
Distance to secondary school (km) 0.9*** 0.6*** 0.9*** 0.6***
Distance to metropolitan area (km) -16.9*** -19.4*** -23.1*** -28.8***
Distance to the main city
of her/his municipality (km) -0.6** -0.4** -0.2 -0.8***
* Statistical significance = 10%. ** Statistical significance = 5%. *** Statistical significance = 1%.
The statistical significance of the differences is tested using tests for equality of means or proportions.
An important fact pointed out by Tables 2 and 3, is the low enrollment rate
of drop-outs. Only almost 60% of primary school children are actually attending
class. Still worse is the situation for secondary children. Only 25% of them go to
school. Compared with non-drop-outs, enrollment rates after the implementation of
the program are 45% lower for primary school drop-outs, and more than 50% lower
for secondary school drop-outs. Some questions naturally arise from these figures.
Why are these differences so large? Why is a child that decided not attend school
once unlikely to re-enroll? Can we infer from these numbers that PROGRESA is not
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working all that well for drop-outs contrary to what we expected?
To answer the first two questions take a look at Table 3. Again, as in Section 3.2,
we conclude that, not considering grants, drop-outs have more incentives to work than
to attend school. Moreover, a higher proportion of drop-outs come from poor families
and with unemployed heads of households. Also, they have a higher direct cost of at-
tending secondary school reflected in higher distances to secondary schools. Another
explanation for the differences in enrollment rates could be that some unobserved
characteristics as ability or personal ambition affect a child’s schooling decision.
The remaining question is if the PROGRESA program is convincing those children
who dropped out of school before the implementation of the program to go back to
school and finish their education. If the answer is yes this implies that without the
program enrollment rates would be much lower. On the other hand, if the program
is not working for drop-outs pre and post program enrollment rates should be equal.
In both situations it is necessary to study alternatives schemes for the grant design
that could send more drop-outs back to school.
The answer cannot be obtained by just looking at descriptive statistics but needs
to make use of the randomized assignment of the program. Comparison of results
between treatment and control communities allows us to estimate the causal rela-
tionship between enrollment decision and PROGRESA grants.
5 Difference estimation of PROGRESA impact
The random assignment of PROGRESA at community level has a crucial advantage.
Randomization balances all observed and unobserved variables other than enrollment
decision and treatment status across the two groups (treatment and control). Hence,
this makes it possible to quantify the effect of the program on enrollment rates by
simply comparing enrollment in treatment vs. enrollment in control communities,
i.e., difference estimation can simply measure the program’s effects.
To analyze if there exist differences in the effect of the program on non-drop-out
and drop-outs we can estimate separately difference estimators for both groups, and
compare the results.
In the context of this paper difference estimators are defined in the following form:
Eˆn(Sit | grantit > 0, Pi = 1)− Eˆn(Sit | grantit = 0, Pi = 1) (1)
i = 1, ..., N t = 2, 3, 4
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where
Sit: dummy equal 1 if the child is enrolled in school at time t.
Eˆn: post-program period averages.
grantit: the potential grant amount, that takes a value different from zero only
if the child belongs to a poor family, resides in a PROGRESA community, and is
attending a grade between 3rd year of primary school and 3rd year of junior secondary
school. grantit > 0 defines the treatment group while grantit = 0 defines the control
group7.
Pi: is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the child belongs to a poor
family.
t = 1, 2, 3, 4 identify the October 1997 census and the October 1998, May 1999
and November 1999 surveys, respectively.
Unfortunately, difference estimation applied to the original data set partitioned in
our two groups, drop-outs and non-drop-outs, may not be reliable. Randomization in
the assignment of the program assures that any kind of analysis of the complete panel
that implies disaggregation based on observable characteristics, other than the depen-
dent variable and the treatment definition variable, is valid. Also, a sufficiently high
number of observations is needed for a law of large numbers to hold in both groups
defined by the treatment status. However, the variable that defines the groups under
analysis is the dependent variable, school enrollment, in October 1997. Moreover, the
drop-outs panel fails to contain enough observations when we split the data between
treatment and controls, by school level and by gender8.
Only if randomization still holds when considering non-drop-outs and drop-outs
observations separately, difference estimation is valid. But this is not the case here. I
carried out an analysis of the randomization in both sub-panels following the method-
ology of Behrman and Todd (1999). Comparing means and distributions of observable
characteristics between treatment and control observations I found some differences.
Hence, the main conclusion is that the assignment of the program is not completely
random when considering the groups as presented. Results for a set of relevant vari-
ables can be consulted in Table 9 and Table 10 of the Appendix. Therefore, difference
estimation cannot provide accurate results. However, they could give us a first idea
of the grant’s impact on non-drop-outs and drop-outs.
The program’s effects difference estimation in the post-program periods by grade
7For children who fulfill the requirement to obtain the grant but are not receiving it I set grantit =
0. In the calculus of difference estimates they belong to the control group.
8Size for each group are reported in Table 8 of the Appendix.
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completed are reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Difference estimation of program’s effects
Years of schooling Post-Program Differences
completed in Non-drop-outs Drop-outs
previous year Female Male Female Male
From 2 to 5 0.0220*** 0.0195*** 0.0220 0.1517***
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0354) (0.0322)
6 0.1216*** 0.0767*** 0.1256*** 0.0457*
(0.0155) (0.0146) (0.0194) (0.0242)
7 or more 0.0242** 0.0137 0.2142*** 0.0166
(0.0081) (0.0088) (0.0737) (0.0767)
Sample size:
Primary 23,564 25,521 1,310 1,490
Secondary 8,659 9,735 2,431 1,717
* Statistical significance = 10%. ** Statistical significance = 5%. *** Statistical significance = 1%.
The statistical significance of the differences is tested using a test for equality of proportions.
The statistic has a standard normal distribution. In particular, I test whether the proportion
of children enrolled in school is the same within the two groups defined by treatment status.
Consider secondary school girls in the non-drop-out group that have completed
grade 6. The corresponding figure in the previous table should be interpreted as
follows: mean enrollment rates for secondary school girls that did not drop-out of
school are higher for those who receive the grant. In other words, enrollment rate for
this group is 12.16% higher due to the grant.
For the non-drop-outs we observe a positive effect of the program on girls and
boys in all grades. The program has the strongest effect for girls and boys in 6th
grade , when they have just finished primary school and are about to start secondary
school. This is a good result since the lowest enrollment rates are precisely in that
grade and it is crucial for the purpose of human capital accumulation that those
children at least enter secondary school. Here the effect is higher for girls than for
boys probably due to the fact that at this level grants paid to girls are higher than
those paid to boys. The estimated effects for non-drop-outs are similar to the results
obtained from post-program differences by Schultz (2004)9.
9As it can be seen in Table 7 in the Appendix, confidence intervals in this paper include or are
included in Schultz’s intervals in 6 out of 10 results presented.
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Comparing results for non-drop-outs and drop-outs, I found the expected higher
effect on drop-outs in primary school boys. However, this is not the result for children
in secondary school. In particular, for girls there exist a small difference while for
drop-outs boys the effect is clearly lower than the effect for non-drop-outs boys.
6 The enrollment decision equation
6.1 A general enrollment decision equation with PROGRESA
variables
Following the discussion presented in Section 3.2 and including variables that reflect
the impact of the PROGRESA program, a reduced form equation in latent variable
form for the probability of being enrolled in school at time t, S ∗it, is
10:
S∗it = ηi + α0t + α1Pi + α2Ti +
8∑
k=2
α3kgrantkit +
K∑
k=1
γkCkit +
J∑
j=1
βjXjit + eit (2)
i = 1, 2..., n t = 2, 3, 4 and eit ∼ F
What we observe, in fact is:
Si = 1[S
∗
i > 0] i = 1, 2..., n (3)
ηi is an unobserved factor, individual specific and time-constant. It may reflect
ability, personal ambition, etc.
α0t is a time variant unobserved effect.
Pi is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the child belongs to a poor
family.
Ti is a dummy variable that takes on value 1 if the child lives in a community
where the program started in September 1998, i.e., in a treatment community.
grantit as defined in Section 5
11.
10This reduced form equation is similar to the one proposed in Schultz (2004). The main differ-
ences are the introduction of an additional term to allow for time-constant unobserved effects and
the introduction of a set of variables that allow for identification of differential effects of the program
for drop-outs.
11For children who fulfill the requirement to obtain the grant but are not receiving it I set grantit =
0 and Ti = 1.
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Ckit is equal to 1 if the child has successfully completed k years of school, k = 1 or
less, 2, ..., 8 and 9 or more, which qualifies the child for enrollment in (k+ 1)th grade.
Xjit are a set of J individual, family, and community characteristics that includes
the age of the child and the square of the age, mother’s schooling, a dummy equal to
one if the head of household was ill, a dummy equal to one if the head of household
was employed in the week before the survey was conducted, a dummy set equal to 1
if the father lives at home, the number of girls younger than 16 years in the family,
and the number of boys younger than 16 years in the family, the number of children
younger than 5 years in the family, the number of adults women and men in the
family, number of siblings enrolled in school, daily mean agricultural wage for men,
distance to nearest junior secondary school, distance to nearest metropolitan area,
and distance to the main city of her/his municipality.
F any distribution function.
The expected values for the coefficients are the following. α1 should be negative
reflecting the common hypothesis that credit constraints limit the investment of the
poor in their children’s education. The effect of residing in a treatment community,
or α2, should be close to zero, since the assignment of the program is random, or
slightly positive capturing some “spillover effects” of the treated communities on the
control communities. α3k captures the program effects, so it is greater than zero if
the program successfully reaches its goal.
For the β′s, we expect a negative effect of age, since for a given grade being older
implies higher costs of schooling (higher opportunity costs for being more likely to
get a job and to obtain a higher salary, psychological cost of disappointment if she/he
failed, etc), a positive effect if the mother is more educated, a negative effect if the
head of the household was ill and a positive effect if she/he had a job, a positive effect
if the father lives at home, also a positive effect if the proportion of siblings attending
school is higher, a negative effect from the opportunity cost of schooling (captured by
wages), a negative effect from the direct cost of attending a junior secondary school
(i.e. the non-existence of a school in the community), and finally a positive effect of
the distance to the nearest metropolitan area and of the distance to the main city of
her/his municipality.
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6.2 Allowing for differences between drop-outs and non-drop-
outs
To answer the question “Did PROGRESA send drop-outs back to school?” it is nec-
essary to model the probability of being enrolled for individual i at time t conditional
on the schooling decision she/he made before the program started:
P(Sit | Si1) t = 2, 3, 4 (4)
and then compare these probabilities between ex-ante drop-outs (Si1 = 0) and
children who were at school before the program started (Si1 = 1).
In order to capture the differences in the program’s effects on non-drop-outs com-
pared to drop-outs, the equation for the enrollment decision is modified as follows:
S∗it = ηi + α0t + α1Pi + α2Ti + α3Di + α4Pi ∗Di + α5Ti ∗Di+ (5)
8∑
k=2
α6kgrantkit +
8∑
k=2
α7kgrantkit ∗Di +
K∑
k=1
γkCkit +
J∑
j=1
βjXjit + eit
i = 1, 2..., n and t = 2, 3, 4
where Di is a dummy variable, that takes a value of 1 if the child dropped out of
school before the program started.
The impact of the program for non-drop-outs is captured by the variable “grant”,
i.e., by the coefficient α6k. The impact for drop-outs is given by α6k + α7k. Hence,
the difference in the program’s impacts on non-drop-outs and drop-outs, is equal to
α7k.
7 Maximum Likelihood estimation of PROGRESA
impact
In order to estimate the parameters we have to take into account two characteristics
of this equation. First, it is a probability model, and second, there is an unobserved
fixed effect.
A fixed effects conditional logit model allow us to consistently estimate the param-
eters using a non-linear model and without any assumptions on how ηi is correlated
with the exogenous variables. This approach is desirable for at least three reasons.
The estimated probabilities are between 0 and 1, marginal effects are individual spe-
cific and it allows for the most flexible specification of the unobserved heterogeneity.
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However, such a model cannot be applied to the equation above since there is not
enough variation in the data. A fixed effects non-linear estimation strategy can only
considers observations for which the dependent variable has time variation. Apply-
ing this restriction to the PROGRESA panel we are left with 9,036 observations. Of
those observations only 1,632 refer to drop-outs. This is not enough data to identify
the effect of interest.
Another alternative would be to use a fixed effects linear model. It also has
the most flexible specification for the fixed effect, so consistency is not an issue.
Nevertheless, it has problems associated with the estimation of a probability using a
linear model. The main concern is about the marginal effects that in this model are
assumed to be constant among individuals. In the context of schooling decision this
assumption is not realistic. Moreover, this procedure leads to lower precision (high
standard errors) in the estimated parameters.
Hence, the most flexible specification for the unobserved factor that can still iden-
tify the effect of the program in a non-linear probability model, is the one proposed
by Chamberlain (1980) and Mundlak (1978), known as Correlated Random Effects
Probit model. This model explicitly allows the individual specific unobservable term
ηi to be correlated with time variant regressors assuming a conditional normal distri-
bution with linear expectation and constant variance. The specification assumed for
ηi is:
ηi = ψ + ξx¯i + ai (6)
where x¯i is a vector including the average of: i)daily mean agricultural wage for
men, ii)head of households’ health and work status and iiii)grant amount interacted
with the drop-out dummy12.
The complete set of assumptions for the enrollment decision equation estimation
is the following:
1. eit|ηi, Pi, Ti, Di, grantkit, Ckit, Xjit ∼ Φ ∀i,∀t,∀k,∀j
12This correlation is only allowed between time variant variables and the fixed effect. A potential
source of bias in this model is the existence of correlation between the unobserved term and some
time constant variables. In the model presented so far the dummy Di may be correlated with
ηi, since some unobserved factor could have determined the decision of dropping out of school. I
considered this fact in the model including the grant amount multiplied by the drop-out dummy in
the vector x¯i. Additionally, I estimated the equation using a fixed effects linear model. Results are
presented in Table 11 and Table 12 of the Appendix. Estimated parameters and marginal effects
are, at least qualitatively, equivalent to the ones obtained with the correlated probit model.
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where Φ stands for the standard normal distribution
2. Si1...SiT are independent conditional on ηi, Pi, Ti, Di, grantkit, Ckit, Xjit
∀i, ∀t,∀k,∀j
3. ηi|Pi, Ti, Di, grantkit, Ckit, Xjit ∼ N(ψ + x¯iξ, σ2a)
Since coefficients can only be interpreted qualitatively I present here the results
for the marginal effects. A complete report of the estimation results can be found
in Table 14 of the Appendix13. I chose to present the average values of estimated
marginal effects across treated individuals. They are defined as follows:
Let Zkit be the vector of explanatory variables:
Zkit ≡
(
1, x¯i, grantk, grantk ∗Di, X1it...XJit
)′
for each k = 2...8.
Let Z0kit be the same vector with the only difference that grantki = 0, for all
individuals in all time periods:
Z0kit ≡ (1, x¯i, 0, 0, X1it...XJit)′
Let pˆik be the vector of estimated parameters.
Finally, the average values of estimated marginal effects across treated individuals
are calculated using the following expression:
∑
i: granti>0
4∑
t=2
[Φ(pˆik ∗ Zkit)− Φ(pˆik ∗ Z0kit)] (7)
where Φ stands for the normal distribution function. I calculated the average of
the change in enrollment probabilities due to the implementation of the grant for
children in conditions of receiving a grant (treated individuals). These averages were
obtained for non-drop-outs (i with Di = 0) and drop-outs (i with Di = 1) separately.
Table 5 presents the average values of estimated marginal effects across treated
individuals.
13A full description of the variables is presented in Table 13 of the Appendix.
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Table 5: Average values of estimated marginal effects across treated individuals
Years of schooling
completed in Non-drop-outs Drop-outs
previous year Female Male Female Male
From 2 to 5 0.0087* 0.0015 -0.0518 0.1071
(0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0955) (0.0732)
6 0.0530** 0.0189 0.0103 0.1141**
(0.0214) (0.0158) (0.1005) (0.0483)
7 or more 0.0159** -0.0009 -0.1957*** -0.0224
(0.0075) (0.0095) (0.0621) (0.0965)
Mean grant:
Primary school 118.2 118.4 118.2 118.4
Secondary school 261.7 244.4 261.7 244.4
Sample size:
Primary school 8,118 8,893 352 474
Secondary school 3,344 3,918 1,083 815
Standard errors calculated by bootstrap with 1000 replications reported in
parentheses. * Statistical significance = 10%. ** Statistical significance = 5%.
*** Statistical significance = 1%. Cluster at family level.
Consider non-drop-out girls that have completed 6 years of schooling and are
receiving the grant. The average probability of enrollment for a girl in this group
is 5.3% higher when she is receiving the mean grant compared to when she is not
receiving it. The probability of being enrolled is 5.3% higher due to the grant. With
this kind of interpretation in mind, we can derive several conclusions.
In general the grant effect is positive. In four cases the effect is negative but
insignificant due to huge standard errors, so the effect of interest in those cases is
not clearly identified (as it happens with girls in primary school). The impact of the
program is higher in secondary school than in primary school. This is an expected
result because grants in secondary school are more than twice the amount of grants
in primary school. Additionally, since enrollment rates are lower in the secondary
level of education the program has more scope to work at this level.
The average effect of the grant for girls is higher than for boys in the non-drop-
out group. This is due to the fact that girls in secondary school are receiving higher
grants than boys. Surprisingly, the same is not true in the group of drop-outs. Drop-
out boys react more strongly to the grant, even though they receive less money than
girls.
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The effects are different when we compare drop-outs with non-drop-outs. Since
the standard errors of the estimated effects for drop-outs in primary school are quite
high, I do not made conclusions on these groups and, in what follows, all comments
refers to secondary school children. For those children that have to enter in secondary
school (6 years of schooling completed) the results are conclusive enough. There is no
effect of grants in the re-enrolment decision of drop-outs girls while for non-drop-outs
grants increase their enrolment probability by more than 5%. Drop-out boys react
more to the incentive given by grants than non-drop-outs. After receiving the grant
the enrolment probability of both groups increase, but for drop-outs this increase is
almost 10% higher than for non-drop-outs.
Even though the equality of average marginal effects between drop-outs and non-
drop-outs cannot be rejected at standard levels of significance14, 25, 50 and 75 per-
centiles and the distribution of marginal effects between both groups15 show notable
differences. Moreover, p-values from kolmogorov-smirnov tests of equality of distri-
butions of marginal effects between drop-outs and non-drop-outs are always bellow
0.001, so the null hypothesis of equality is in all cases rejected even at 1% of sig-
nificance. Figures 2 and 3 below depict marginal effects distributions stressing this
conclusion.
For girls that are about to enter in secondary school, the average impact is 5% for
non-drop-outs while the corresponding figure for drop-outs is only 1% and statistically
zero. Main characteristics of the distributions are a smaller range for drop-outs, from
0.0 to 0.025, and for non-drop-outs a high dispersion with almost all frequencies
below 5%. Thus, for girls who have to decide whether to enter in secondary school
grants are more convincing for those who were at school before the implementation
of the program. PROGRESA education grants are not a strong enough incentive
to persuade drop-out girls to start secondary school. Notice that for this group the
conclusion does not support the initial hypothesis that was made simply considering
observable characteristics.
14I tested differences in the averages of marginal effects by bootstrap (1000 replications) and
most of the p-values obtained are higher than 0.15. All test results are reported in Table 16 of the
Appendix.
15Reported in Table 15 of the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Marginal effects distribution: female primary school completed (grade 6
completed)
Drop-Outs
Non-Drop-Outs
- - - (dashed line) Average marginal effect for non-drop-outs
—– (continuous line) Average marginal effect for drop-outs
Turning to boys that have completed 6th grade, there is an important and sta-
tistically significant difference in average marginal effects, more than 9% higher for
drop-outs (2% for non-drop-outs, 11% for drop-outs). For non-drop-outs the distri-
bution has a small range, from 0 to 0.05 with the highest frequency, more than 30%,
between 0 and 0.002. The distribution for drop-outs, on the other hand, is highly
dispersed between 0 and 0.37 with frequencies in general below 5%. 25, 50 and 75
percentiles are all higher for drop-outs. The message is clear. The program has a
stronger effect on boys about to start secondary school who dropped-out in 1997 or
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before than on those who stayed on school.
Figure 3: Marginal effects distribution: male primary school completed (grade 6
completed)
Drop-Outs
Non-Drop-Outs
- - - (dashed line) Average marginal effect for non-drop-outs
—– (continuous line) Average marginal effect for drop-outs
Summing up, the estimated results presented above allow us to conclude that
there exists a differential effect of the grant between children that dropped out of
school before the program started and those who did not. The direction of differential
effects in secondary school is not uniform for girls and boys. Drop-outs boys react
more strongly to the program’s incentives than non-drop-outs. Non-drop-outs girls
have stronger grants’ effects than drop-outs. Therefore, I found the expected result
of a higher effect of the grants on drop-outs in secondary school only for boys. In
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general the program is effective for children that dropped out of school before they
started receiving any grants. But when they have to decide to enter secondary school
PROGRESA grants provide a better incentive for boys than for girls.
8 Conclusions
There exist evidence of differences in the effects of the PROGRESA program effects
on the overall target population and on the children who face a re-enrollment deci-
sion. These difference are observed in all groups analyzed. But the direction of the
difference varies across groups. The expected result of a higher program effect on
drop-outs was found for boys in conditions of attending primary or secondary school.
For girls in secondary school who dropped out in 1997 or before, the grant is not as
good incentive to enroll in school as it is for non-drop-out girls. Among drop-outs
in secondary school the impact of the education grants is lower for girls even though
they receive more money than boys. The different responses of girls and boys to the
grant in secondary school should be studied in more detail.
The last finding motivates the design of a particular model of schooling decision
for girls. Individual variables such as marital state, pregnancy and number of children
should be considered. Moreover, it can be argued that girls face a third option other
than schooling or working. They may stay at home and take care of the children in
the family. A model of schooling decisions should reflect this third option for girls.
Additionally, there exist some perception that in the poorest rural communities girls
are discriminated, so a monetary incentive like the PROGRESA grants may not be
effective.
An important point in the evaluation of the program’s impact is if it is better
to model the schooling decision as an individual or as a family decision. In fact,
the program limits aid to a maximum amount per family. This may affect family
decisions about children schooling and the allocation of resources among them. This
feature of the program cannot be reflected in the reduced form equation presented so
far.
At a methodological level, the estimation of PROGRESA effects and the differ-
ential impact over drop-outs can be improved by constructing a structural model of
schooling. With the design of such a model, we might obtained a more conclusive
answer to the question “Did PROGRESA send drop-outs back to school?”. More-
over, the estimation of a structural model will allow for the identification of a more
effective and efficient policy that can send drop-outs back to school.
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Appendix
Table 2(continued)
Variable Primary Secondary
Female Male Female Male
Years of schooling completed
0 0.000 0.003
1 0.170 0.150
2 0.114 0.117
3 0.439 0.401
4 0.113 0.154
5 0.164 0.176
6 0.863 0.816
7 0.071 0.072
8 0.019 0.039
9 or more 0.047 0.073
Age of child
8 0.070 0.070
9 0.115 0.090
10 0.091 0.086
11 0.092 0.089 0.001 0.000
12 0.106 0.097 0.015 0.015
13 0.125 0.097 0.096 0.087
14 0.127 0.133 0.253 0.209
15 0.134 0.149 0.310 0.306
16 0.111 0.144 0.247 0.288
17 0.029 0.045 0.075 0.093
18 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for Non-Drop-outs (post-program surveys)
Variable Primary Secondary
Female Male Female Male
Sample size 25,564 23,521 8,659 9,735
Enrollment rate 0.976 0.971 0.767 0.790
Percentage of treatment communities 60.79 62.20 60.85 62.10
Percentage of children belonging
to a poor family 89.44 89.85 80.51 81.87
Percentage of children eligible
for receiving a grant 31.8 30.8 38.6 40.2
Grant (for grant different from zero) (pesos) 118.2 118.2 265.2 245.8
(29.7) (29.8) (28.1) (20.4)
Mother’s schooling (years) 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9
(2.6) (2.6) (2.5) (2.5)
Percentage of children with
head of household ill 5.96 6.26 7.10 7.14
Percentage of children with
head of household employed 91.80 91.60 90.03 89.51
Percentage of children
with father not living at home 9.83 10.11 10.50 11.07
Number of girls from 5 to 16 2.0 1.0 1.9 0.9
(1.2) (1.0) (1.1) (1.0)
Number of boys from 5 to 16 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.9
(1.0) (1.1) ( 1.0) (1.1)
Number of children under 5 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5
(1.0) (1.0) ( 0.8) (0.8)
Number of adult women 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.6
(0.8) (0.9) (1.0) (0.9)
Number of adult men 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8
(0.9) (0.9) (1.0) (1.0)
Number of siblings enrolled at school 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.7
(1.3) (1.4) (1.3) (1.4)
Distance to secondary school (km) 2.3 2.3 1.9 2.0
(2.1) (2.1) (1.8) (1.8)
Percentage of children that have
a secondary school in their community 23.2 26.5 32.6 28.3
Distance to nearest metropolitan area (km) 148.7 150.4 152.3 154.1
(76.8) (77.0) (77.4) (77.5)
Distance to the main city
of her/his municipality (km) 11.7 11.6 11.8 11.5
(8.1) (7.9) (8.2) (8.0)
Community daily agricultural wage (pesos) 30.6 30.5 31.8 31.2
(10.6) (10.5) (10.8) (10.4)
Years of schooling completed
0 0.000 0.000
1 0.200 0.207
2 0.181 0.184
3 0.279 0.271
4 0.177 0.172
5 0.164 0.166
6 0.489 0.455
7 0.231 0.245
8 0.175 0.190
9 or more 0.105 0.110
Age of child
6 0.073 0.069
7 0.146 0.136
8 0.155 0.151
9 0.155 0.152
10 0.151 0.148
11 0.151 0.142 0.023 0.021
12 0.092 0.098 0.181 0.139
13 0.042 0.056 0.255 0.224
14 0.022 0.028 0.232 0.247
15 0.008 0.013 0.182 0.210
16 0.003 0.005 0.103 0.127
17 0.000 0.001 0.022 0.030
18 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001
Standard deviations are in parenthesis
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Table 7: Comparison with Schultz (2004) confidence intervals for post-program dif-
ference estimation
Years of This paper Schultz (2004)a
schooling 95% Conf. Interval 95% Conf. Interval
completed
2
Female 0.0144 0.0352 -0.0111 0.0471
Male 0.0054 0.0217 0.0209 0.0210
3
Female -0.0026 0.0155 -0.0122 0.0382
Male 0.0061 0.0274 0.0489 0.0490
4
Female 0.0035 0.0267 0.0279 0.0481
Male 0.0108 0.0332 0.0439 0.0440
5
Female 0.0287 0.0582 0.0457 0.0643
Male 0.0101 0.0407 0.0409 0.0410
6
Female 0.0910 0.1521 0.1479 0.1480
Male 0.0481 0.1054 0.0531 0.0769
aThe results are taken from Table 3 in Schultz (2004).
Table 8: Groups size
Years of schooling
completed in Non-drop-outs Drop-outs
previous year Female Male Female Male
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
From 2 to 5 8,118 6,317 8,893 6,832 352 372 474 393
6 1,889 1,678 2,050 1,710 956 814 688 476
7 or more 1,455 1,246 1,868 1,479 127 61 113 53
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Table 9: p-values for test of randomization - Drop-out Observations
p-value based
Variable p-value on community
(2,025 obs) mean (440 obs)
Community population distribution – 0.101 (3)
Distribution of communities over states – 0.897 (3)
Age distribution of children under 16 0.892 (3) 0.925 (4)
Child’s stock of education 0.107 (3) 0.340 (4)
Number of girls between 5 and 16 in the family 0.440 (3) 0.756 (4)
Number of boys between 5 and 16 in the family 0.426 (3) 0.336 (4)
Number of children under 5 in the family 0.099 (3) 0.856 (4)
Number of adult women in the family 0.002 (3) 0.456 (4)
Number of adult men in the family 0.180 (3) 0.720 (4)
Mother’s schooling 0.000 (3) 0.955 (4)
Percentage of children with 0.008 (2) 0.120 (4)
father not living at home
Percentage of children with 0.019 (2) 0.321 (4)
head of household employed
Number of siblings enrolled 0.765 (1) 0.474 (4)
at school
Community daily agricultural wage 0.000 (1) 0.914 (4)
Distance to metropolitan area 0.000 (1) 0.964 (4)
Distance to the main city 0.001 (1) 0.742 (4)
of her/his municipality
Distance to secondary school 0.001 (1) 0.799 (4)
(1)Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for test of equality between two distribution functions. Ho: the distribution of the
variable analyzed is equal in both groups
(2)T-test for equality of proportions. Ho: the variable analyzed has the same proportion of ones in both groups.
(3)Pearson’s chi-squared statistic for the hypothesis that the frequencies in a two-way tabular are independent. Ho:
the frequencies of the variable analyzed are independent.
(4)T-test for equality of means. Ho: the variable analyzed has the same mean in both groups.
Conclusion: At individual level several variables are different when comparing treatment and controls. At community
level there exist statistical differences in a couple of variables. Hence, the random assignment of the program is lost
when considering the group of drop-outs separately.
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Table 10: p-values for test of randomization - Non-drop-out Observations
p-value based
Variable p-value on community
(19,649 obs) mean (492 obs)
Community population distribution – 0.119 (3)
Distribution of communities over states – 0.781 (3)
Age distribution of children under 16 0.230 (3) 0.925 (4)
Child’s stock of education 0.009 (3) 0.369 (4)
Number of girls between 5 and 16 in the family 0.001 (3) 0.789 (4)
Number of boys between 5 and 16 in the family 0.000 (3) 0.415 (4)
Number of children under 5 in the family 0.000 (3) 0.295 (4)
Number of adult women in the family 0.000 (3) 0.701 (4)
Number of adult men in the family 0.007 (3) 0.525 (4)
Mother’s schooling 0.002 (3) 0.930 (4)
Percentage of children with 0.266 (2) 0.794 (4)
father not living at home
Percentage of children with 0.016 (2) 0.324 (4)
head of household employed
Number of siblings enrolled 0.000 (1) 0.957 (4)
at school
Community daily agricultural wage 0.000 (1) 0.997 (4)
Distance to metropolitan area 0.000 (1) 0.989 (4)
Distance to the main city 0.000 (1) 0.414 (4)
of her/his municipality
Distance to secondary school 0.000 (1) 0.615 (4)
(1), (2), (3) and (4) idem Table 9.
Conclusion: There exist even more relevant differences at the individual level than those presented in Table 9. The
evidence of lack of randomization is stronger when considering the group of non-drop-outs separately.
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Table 11: Fixed-effects (within) regression coefficientsa
Number of obs = 74,427
Number of groups = 24,809
R-sq: within = 0.3887 Obs per group: min = 3
between = 0.3643 avg = 3
overall = 0.3580 max = 3
F (86, 49,532) = 366.15
corr(ui,Xb) = -0.4034 Prob > F = 0.0000
Percentage correctly predicted = 0.8486
enrolled Coefficient Standard Error t P > |t| 95% Conf. Interval
grantfp 0.0000 0.0001 0.0900 0.9250 -0.0001 0.0002
grantdfp -0.0023 0.0005 -4.9700 0.0000 -0.0032 -0.0014
grantc6fs 0.0001 0.0001 1.6900 0.0900 0.0000 0.0002
grantd6fs -0.0013 0.0002 -5.4300 0.0000 -0.0017 -0.0008
grantc7fs 0.00003 0.0001 0.7600 0.4480 -0.0001 0.0001
grantd7fs -0.0012 0.0002 -6.0500 0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0008
grantmp 0.0001 0.0001 1.6600 0.0970 0.0000 0.0003
grantdmp 0.0002 0.0004 0.5700 0.5700 -0.0006 0.0011
grantc6ms 0.0001 0.0001 1.1200 0.2640 0.0000 0.0002
grantd6ms 0.0002 0.0002 0.7300 0.4660 -0.0003 0.0006
grantc7ms 0.00003 0.0001 0.7300 0.4660 -0.0001 0.0001
grantd7ms 0.0001 0.0002 0.2900 0.7700 -0.0004 0.0005
σu 0.2598
σe 0.1574
ρ 0.7315 ( fraction of variance due to ui)
F test that all ui = 0: F (24,808, 49,532) = 4.37 Prob > F = 0.0000
Standard errors are clustered at family level 11.
a For a description of variables look at Table 13.
Table 12: Fixed-effects marginal effects
Years of schooling Non-drop-outs Drop-outs
completed in Female Male Female Male
previous year
From 2 to 5 0.0089 0.0152* -0.2695*** 0.0439
6 0.0250* 0.0153 -0.3051*** 0.0572
7 0.0101 0.0094 -0.2964*** 0.0247
Mean grant:
Primary school 118.2 118.4 118.2 118.4
Secondary school 261.7 244.4 261.7 244.4
Standard errors and p-values are reported in Table 11.
* Statistical significance = 10%. ** Statistical significance = 5%.
*** Statistical significance = 1%.
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Table 13: Description of variables included in Maximum Likelihood estimation
Variable name Description
P One if the child belongs to a poor family
T One if the child resides in a community where PROGRESA grants were implemented in October 1998
D One if the child was not enrolled in school in the October 1997 census
DP Interaction between D (drop-out) and P (poor family)
DT Interaction between D (drop-out) and T (treatment community)
grant Grant amount (pesos)
grantd Grant amount interacted with D (drop-out child) (pesos)
wrepeon Community daily agricultural wage for men (pesos)
health One if the head of household was ill in the four weeks previous to the survey
work One if the head of household has a job in the week previous to the survey
fhogar One if the child’s father is living at home with his family
distsec Distance from the community where the child resides to the nearest community with a secondary
school (km)
distmetro Distance from the community where the child resides to the nearest metropolitan area. For
communities in Hidalgo(state), these are Queretaro, Puebla, Tampico, or Mexico City;
in Michoacan(state) it is Morelia; in Puebla it is Puebla; in Queretaro it is Queretaro; in
San Luis de Potosi it is San Luis de Potosi; in Veracruz it is Veracruz and in Guerrero it
is Acapulco (km)
distcab Distance from the community where the child resides to the main city of her/his municipality (km)
schoolm Years of schooling completed by the child’s mother
girl Number of girls from 5 to 16 years old in the child’s family
boy Number of boys from 5 to 16 years old in the child’s family
baby Number of children aged less than 5 years old in the child’s family
women Number of adult women (aged more than 16) in the child’s family
men Number of adult men (aged more than 16) in the child’s family
w3 One for observations in the first post-program survey collected in October 1998
w4 One for observations in the second post-program survey collected in May 1999
age Age of the child
age2 Square of the age of the child
ck One if the child has completed k years of education (k = 1 or less, 2,..., 9 or more)
ageck Age interacted with the stock of education of the child
asistest Number of child’s siblings enrolled in school
distsecd Distance to secondary school interacted with drop-out dummy D
distcabd Distance to main city at municipality level interacted with drop-out dummy D
workd Variable work (head of household working status) interacted with drop-out dummy D
schoolmd Mother’s stock of education interacted with drop-out dummy D
workm Time average for variable work (3 post-program observations)
healthm Time average for variable health (3 post-program observations)
wrepeonm Time average for variable wrepeon (3 post-program observations)
grantdm Time average for variable grantd (3 post-program observations)
Xfp Variable X interacted with a dummy variable equal 1 for girls in primary school
Xfs Variable X interacted with a dummy variable equal 1 for girls in secondary school
Xmp Variable X interacted with a dummy variable equal 1 for boys in primary school
Xms Variable X interacted with a dummy variable equal 1 for boys in secondary school
X stands for the complete set of variables described above
35
Table 14: Probit estimates of enrollment probabilities
Number of obs = 74,427
Wald χ2(166) = 7,636.54
Log-pseudolikelihood = -9565.1793 Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.6688
Percentage correctly predicted = 95.34%
enrolled Coefficient Standard Error z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Pfp -0.06012 0.12335 -0.49 0.626 -0.30188 0.18164
Tfp 0.036389 0.096795 0.38 0.707 -0.15333 0.226104
Dfp -1.78776 0.439293 -4.07 0.000 -2.64876 -0.92676
DPfp 0.539533 0.345394 1.56 0.118 -0.13743 1.216493
DTfp 0.233085 0.198013 1.18 0.239 -0.15501 0.621183
grantfp 0.002198 0.000881 2.5 0.013 0.000471 0.003925
grantdfp -0.00452 0.003856 -1.17 0.242 -0.01207 0.003042
agefp 0.329558 0.160167 2.06 0.04 0.015638 0.643479
age2fp -0.02601 0.007755 -3.35 0.001 -0.04121 -0.01081
c2fp 2.228879 0.497638 4.48 0.000 1.253527 3.204232
c3fp 1.676924 0.655976 2.56 0.011 0.391236 2.962613
c4fp 1.73503 0.744903 2.33 0.02 0.275047 3.195013
c5fp 1.829776 0.769984 2.38 0.017 0.320634 3.338917
agec2fp -0.22695 0.049548 -4.58 0.000 -0.32407 -0.12984
agec3fp -0.16305 0.057249 -2.85 0.004 -0.27525 -0.05084
agec4fp -0.14192 0.063374 -2.24 0.025 -0.26613 -0.01771
agec5fp -0.14879 0.06407 -2.32 0.02 -0.27436 -0.02322
wrepeonfp -0.00322 0.003184 -1.01 0.312 -0.00946 0.003019
distsecfp 0.028863 0.016966 1.7 0.089 -0.00439 0.062116
distcabfp 0.001253 0.00405 0.31 0.757 -0.00668 0.00919
distmetrofp 0.001298 0.000486 2.67 0.008 0.000346 0.00225
schoolmfp -0.00521 0.014298 -0.36 0.715 -0.03324 0.02281
healthfp -0.21307 0.083881 -2.54 0.011 -0.37747 -0.04867
workfp -0.09014 0.113698 -0.79 0.428 -0.31298 0.132706
fhogarfp 0.40628 0.137486 2.96 0.003 0.136812 0.675747
girlfp -0.44548 0.048201 -9.24 0.000 -0.53995 -0.35101
boyfp -0.53084 0.04877 -10.88 0.000 -0.62642 -0.43525
babyfp -0.00321 0.034287 -0.09 0.925 -0.07041 0.063991
womenfp 0.005986 0.047786 0.13 0.9 -0.08767 0.099645
menfp 0.024404 0.038311 0.64 0.524 -0.05068 0.099491
asistestfp 1.505614 0.059769 25.19 0.000 1.38847 1.622758
distsecdfp -0.05231 0.03061 -1.71 0.087 -0.1123 0.007689
distcabdfp 0.019577 0.009987 1.96 0.05 2.31E-06 0.039151
workdfp 0.535823 0.254472 2.11 0.035 0.037067 1.034579
grantdmfp -0.00262 0.004232 -0.62 0.536 -0.01091 0.005676
wrepeonmfp 0.006664 0.004662 1.43 0.153 -0.00247 0.015802
workmfp 0.28682 0.195492 1.47 0.142 -0.09634 0.669977
healthmfp 0.521563 0.215596 2.42 0.016 0.099003 0.944122
workdmfp -0.35971 0.353035 -1.02 0.308 -1.05165 0.332224
asistemstfp -0.66512 0.053696 -12.39 0.000 -0.77037 -0.55988
w3fp 0.093972 0.049281 1.91 0.057 -0.00262 0.19056
w4fp -0.05902 0.044302 -1.33 0.183 -0.14585 0.027812
cons 0.17941 0.851053 0.21 0.833 -1.48862 1.847444
(continued on next page)
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Table 14(continued)
enrolled Coefficient Standard Error z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Pfs -0.33882 0.095044 -3.56 0.000 -0.5251 -0.15254
Tfs 0.120591 0.088996 1.36 0.175 -0.05384 0.29502
Dfs 8.186298 5.750446 1.42 0.155 -3.08437 19.45696
DPfs 0.075007 0.202451 0.37 0.711 -0.32179 0.471803
DTfs -0.0103 0.197861 -0.05 0.958 -0.3981 0.377501
grantc6fs 0.001144 0.000435 2.63 0.009 0.000292 0.001997
grantdc6fs -0.0009 0.002183 -0.41 0.679 -0.00518 0.003375
grantc7fs 0.001022 0.000473 2.16 0.031 9.41E-05 0.00195
grantdc7fs -0.00545 0.001853 -2.94 0.003 -0.00908 -0.00182
agefs -0.71461 0.461384 -1.55 0.121 -1.61891 0.189682
age2fs 0.016453 0.014813 1.11 0.267 -0.01258 0.045486
c6fs 1.629472 1.315147 1.24 0.215 -0.94817 4.207113
c7fs 5.006646 1.351812 3.7 0.000 2.357142 7.656149
agec6fs -0.11693 0.086412 -1.35 0.176 -0.28629 0.052434
agec7fs -0.24183 0.088076 -2.75 0.006 -0.41445 -0.0692
wrepeonfs 0.004344 0.00267 1.63 0.104 -0.00089 0.009577
distsecfs -0.05119 0.013887 -3.69 0.000 -0.07841 -0.02397
distmetrofs 0.002178 0.000368 5.91 0.000 0.001456 0.0029
distcabfs 0.000799 0.003078 0.26 0.795 -0.00523 0.006831
schoolmfs 0.032229 0.013253 2.43 0.015 0.006254 0.058204
healthfs -0.15281 0.065867 -2.32 0.02 -0.28191 -0.02372
workfs 0.008876 0.079652 0.11 0.911 -0.14724 0.164991
fhogarfs 0.512864 0.123557 4.15 0.000 0.270697 0.755031
girlfs -0.64605 0.05665 -11.4 0.000 -0.75708 -0.53501
boyfs -0.69022 0.057308 -12.04 0.000 -0.80254 -0.5779
babyfs -0.06231 0.028582 -2.18 0.029 -0.11833 -0.0063
womenfs -0.00992 0.027727 -0.36 0.72 -0.06427 0.04442
menfs -0.0307 0.024896 -1.23 0.217 -0.0795 0.018092
asistestfs 1.651837 0.065212 25.33 0.000 1.524023 1.779651
agedfs -1.2938 0.793451 -1.63 0.103 -2.84893 0.261335
age2dfs 0.046772 0.027289 1.71 0.087 -0.00671 0.100257
schoolmdfs -0.07881 0.031583 -2.5 0.013 -0.14071 -0.01691
grantdc6mfs 0.000432 0.002275 0.19 0.849 -0.00403 0.004891
grantdc7mfs 0.008237 0.002846 2.89 0.004 0.002658 0.013815
wrepeonmfs -0.00456 0.003939 -1.16 0.247 -0.01228 0.00316
workmfs 0.286502 0.175365 1.63 0.102 -0.05721 0.630211
healthmfs 0.244266 0.215016 1.14 0.256 -0.17716 0.66569
asistemstfs -0.67138 0.047703 -14.07 0.000 -0.76488 -0.57789
w3fs 0.378933 0.049531 7.65 0.000 0.281854 0.476012
w4fs 0.35171 0.042589 8.26 0.000 0.268237 0.435182
fs 5.345003 3.769465 1.42 0.156 -2.04301 12.73302
(continued on next page)
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Table 14(continued)
enrolled Coefficient Standard Error z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Pmp 0.0019842 0.1115879 0.02 0.986 -0.216724 0.2206924
Tmp 0.1787204 0.0759595 2.35 0.019 0.029843 0.3275982
Dmp 3.9781890 2.4427500 1.63 0.103 -0.809512 8.7658900
DPmp -0.2495031 0.2543473 -0.98 0.327 -0.748015 0.2490085
DTmp 0.2368955 0.1807437 1.31 0.190 -0.117356 0.5911466
grantmp 0.0003683 0.0007122 0.52 0.605 -0.001028 0.0017642
grantdmp 0.0045421 0.0035240 1.29 0.197 -0.002365 0.0114490
agemp 0.4517245 0.1438856 3.14 0.002 0.169714 0.7337351
age2mp -0.0293674 0.0068852 -4.27 0.000 -0.042862 -0.0158727
c2mp 2.0547600 0.4078813 5.04 0.000 1.255328 2.8541930
c3mp 2.7626040 0.5830192 4.74 0.000 1.619907 3.9053000
c4mp 2.6819920 0.6220860 4.31 0.000 1.462726 3.9012580
c5mp 2.1837420 0.7014966 3.11 0.002 0.808834 3.5586500
agec2mp -0.1899496 0.0392167 -4.84 0.000 -0.266813 -0.1130863
agec3mp -0.2544400 0.0485934 -5.24 0.000 -0.349681 -0.1591988
agec4mp -0.2101065 0.0499493 -4.21 0.000 -0.308005 -0.1122077
agec5mp -0.1773750 0.0550845 -3.22 0.001 -0.285339 -0.0694115
wrepeonmp -0.0038323 0.0033377 -1.15 0.251 -0.010374 0.0027095
distsecmp -0.0003181 0.0134879 -0.02 0.981 -0.026754 0.0261176
distmetromp 0.0025447 0.0004920 5.17 0.000 0.001580 0.0035091
distcabmp 0.0006364 0.0038155 0.17 0.868 -0.006842 0.0081146
schoolmmp 0.0178968 0.0132084 1.35 0.175 -0.007991 0.0437848
healthmp 0.0215211 0.1050984 0.20 0.838 -0.184468 0.2275102
workmp 0.0301827 0.0868495 0.35 0.728 -0.140039 0.2004046
fhogarmp 0.4758867 0.1065015 4.47 0.000 0.267148 0.6846258
girlmp -0.5780486 0.0397477 -14.54 0.000 -0.655953 -0.5001446
boymp -0.4682509 0.0404441 -11.58 0.000 -0.547520 -0.3889820
babymp 0.0172073 0.0294409 0.58 0.559 -0.040496 0.0749103
womenmp 0.0573411 0.0347276 1.65 0.099 -0.010724 0.1254059
menmp 0.0066312 0.0296029 0.22 0.823 -0.051390 0.0646518
asistestmp 1.6161750 0.0665607 24.28 0.000 1.485718 1.7466310
agedmp -0.7478791 0.3750563 -1.99 0.046 -1.482976 -0.0127824
age2dmp 0.0271769 0.0145600 1.87 0.062 -0.001360 0.0557140
wrepeondmp 0.0129225 0.0072253 1.79 0.074 -0.001239 0.0270837
schoolmdmp -0.1354224 0.0340484 -3.98 0.000 -0.202156 -0.0686886
grantdmmp -0.0056409 0.0036899 -1.53 0.126 -0.012873 0.0015912
wrepeonmmp 0.0077109 0.0044644 1.73 0.084 -0.001039 0.0164610
workmmp -0.2277633 0.1669524 -1.36 0.172 -0.554984 0.0994573
healthmmp 0.1251161 0.2103195 0.59 0.552 -0.287103 0.5373348
wrepeondmmp -0.0077973 0.0093024 -0.84 0.402 -0.026030 0.0104351
asistemstmp -0.6956268 0.0626527 -11.10 0.000 -0.818424 -0.5728298
w3mp 0.1979129 0.0510996 3.87 0.000 0.097760 0.2980662
w4mp 0.0023492 0.0438664 0.05 0.957 -0.083627 0.0883257
mp -1.0594210 1.1248610 -0.94 0.346 -3.264109 1.1452670
(continued on next page)
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Table 14(continued)
enrolled Coefficient Standard Error z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Pms -0.35897 0.079264 -4.53 0.000 -0.51433 -0.20362
Tms 0.119921 0.077159 1.55 0.12 -0.03131 0.27115
Dms -1.11906 0.215512 -5.19 0.000 -1.54146 -0.69667
DPms 0.354124 0.207761 1.7 0.088 -0.05308 0.761328
DTms 0.263892 0.204407 1.29 0.197 -0.13674 0.664523
grantc6ms 0.000491 0.000407 1.21 0.227 -0.00031 0.001289
grantdc6ms 0.003254 0.00192 1.69 0.09 -0.00051 0.007018
grantc7ms -5.1E-05 0.000481 -0.11 0.916 -0.00099 0.000893
grantdc7ms -0.00036 0.001714 -0.21 0.833 -0.00372 0.002997
agems -0.80319 0.406263 -1.98 0.048 -1.59945 -0.00693
age2ms 0.019289 0.012876 1.5 0.134 -0.00595 0.044525
c6ms 2.651963 1.256475 2.11 0.035 0.189318 5.114608
c7ms 3.685036 1.233131 2.99 0.003 1.268144 6.101929
agec6ms -0.17643 0.081999 -2.15 0.031 -0.33714 -0.01571
agec7ms -0.16052 0.079794 -2.01 0.044 -0.31691 -0.00412
wrepeonms -0.00493 0.002574 -1.91 0.056 -0.00997 0.00012
distsecms -0.04974 0.01343 -3.7 0.000 -0.07606 -0.02341
distmetroms 0.002609 0.000382 6.82 0.000 0.001859 0.003358
distcabms 0.000743 0.003112 0.24 0.811 -0.00536 0.006842
schoolmms 0.014608 0.011231 1.3 0.193 -0.0074 0.036619
healthms 0.021708 0.08097 0.27 0.789 -0.13699 0.180406
workms 0.106334 0.07132 1.49 0.136 -0.03345 0.246118
fhogarms 0.682057 0.11782 5.79 0.000 0.451135 0.912979
girlms -0.8378 0.052616 -15.92 0.000 -0.94092 -0.73467
boyms -0.72726 0.050609 -14.37 0.000 -0.82645 -0.62807
babyms -0.06182 0.027068 -2.28 0.022 -0.11487 -0.00876
womenms 0.000452 0.029253 0.02 0.988 -0.05688 0.057786
menms -0.05032 0.026325 -1.91 0.056 -0.10191 0.001278
asistestms 1.83169 0.062904 29.12 0.000 1.708399 1.95498
schoolmdms -0.06732 0.032089 -2.1 0.036 -0.13021 -0.00442
grantdc6mms -0.00508 0.00197 -2.58 0.01 -0.00894 -0.00121
grantdc7mms 0.002296 0.002065 1.11 0.266 -0.00175 0.006343
wrepeonmms 0.000636 0.003678 0.17 0.863 -0.00657 0.007845
workmms 0.056352 0.155714 0.36 0.717 -0.24884 0.361547
healthmms -0.28532 0.187619 -1.52 0.128 -0.65305 0.082409
asistemstms -0.73616 0.052679 -13.97 0.000 -0.83941 -0.63291
w3ms 0.267694 0.047753 5.61 0.000 0.174099 0.361288
w4ms 0.223197 0.040794 5.47 0.000 0.143243 0.303151
ms 6.435053 3.395908 1.89 0.058 -0.22081 13.09091
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Table 15: More estimated marginal effects
Years of
schooling Percentile Marginal Standard Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
completed effect
fr
o
m
2
to
5
F
em
a
le
25 0.0001 0.0001 0.1164 -0.0001 0.0002
25d -0.0846 0.1137 0.4565 -0.3076 0.1383
50 0.0009 0.0004 0.0400 0.0000 0.0017
50d -0.0451 0.0777 0.5618 -0.1976 0.1074
75 0.0058 0.0027 0.0307 0.0005 0.0110
75d -0.0120 0.0691 0.8617 -0.1477 0.1236
M
a
le
25 0.0000 0.0006 0.9880 -0.0010 0.0011
25d 0.0200 0.0289 0.4891 -0.0367 0.0767
50 0.0001 0.0002 0.6003 -0.0002 0.0004
50d 0.0916 0.0606 0.1308 -0.0273 0.2106
75 0.0008 0.0012 0.5148 -0.0015 0.0030
75d 0.1717 0.1136 0.1309 -0.0513 0.3946
6
F
em
a
le
25 0.0150 0.0076 0.0491 0.0000 0.0299
25d 0.0034 0.1118 0.9759 -0.2160 0.2228
50 0.0476 0.0205 0.0202 0.0073 0.0877
50d 0.0092 0.0935 0.9219 -0.1743 0.1927
75 0.0914 0.0355 0.0101 0.0216 0.1611
75d 0.0169 0.1023 0.8690 -0.1838 0.2175
M
a
le
25 0.0039 0.0079 0.6208 -0.0115 0.0193
25d 0.0106 0.0137 0.4376 -0.0162 0.0375
50 0.0145 0.0122 0.2353 -0.0094 0.0385
50d 0.0695 0.0260 0.0075 0.0184 0.1205
75 0.0332 0.0251 0.1872 -0.0161 0.0825
75d 0.2084 0.0829 0.0119 0.0458 0.3710
7
F
em
a
le
25 0.0007 0.0005 0.1943 -0.0003 0.0017
25d -0.3394 0.1042 0.0011 -0.5439 -0.1349
50 0.0046 0.0026 0.0763 -0.0004 0.0096
50d -0.1634 0.0634 0.0099 -0.2878 -0.0390
75 0.0185 0.0094 0.0496 0.0000 0.0370
75d -0.0378 0.0278 0.1739 -0.0923 0.0167
M
a
le
25 -0.0013 0.0077 0.8638 -0.0163 0.0137
25d -0.0392 0.1015 0.6993 -0.2384 0.1600
50 -0.0004 0.0033 0.9150 -0.0068 0.0061
50d -0.0245 0.1038 0.8137 -0.2280 0.1791
75 -0.0001 0.0074 0.9934 -0.0146 0.0145
75d -0.0053 0.1018 0.9581 -0.2050 0.1943
25 stands for 25 percentile for non-drop-outs, while 25d stands for 25 percentile for drop-outs
Standard errors calculated by bootstrap with 1000 replications.
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Table 16: Test for differences in marginal effects
Years of schooling Drop-out minus Non-drop-out
completed in Female Male
previous year
From 2 to 5 -0.0606 0.1056
(0.0902) (0.0731)
6 -0.0426 0.0953
(0.1005) (0.0501)
7 -0.2116 -0.0214
(0.0619) (0.0959)
Standard errors calculated by bootstrap with
1000 replications, reported in parenthesis.
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